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ABSTRACT 
Naval Security Cooperation can take many forms from joint exercises to bilateral 
and multilateral agreements. In response to the challenges of providing stability and 
security for the world’s oceans the Thousand-Ship-Navy was born. In the Thousand-
Ship-Navy, partner-nation-navies would voluntarily participate in common maritime 
goals in a “come as you are” manner. One possible vehicle for implementing the 
Thousand-Ship-Navy concept is Maritime Domain Awareness, which seeks to create a 
Common Operating Picture from Naval, Federal, State, Private and International partners. 
These partners would be able to feed into the system any information they gather and 
would be able to access the combined information from all sources in the Common 
Operating Picture. This thesis examines the probability of using Maritime Domain 
Awareness to pursue a Thousand Ship Navy style of Naval Security Cooperation in the 
Eastern Pacific between navies of the United States, Chile and Peru. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis seeks to understand the challenges involved in balancing national 
interest and advancing international naval security cooperation. It will examine the cases 
of the Chilean and Peruvian navies juxtaposed with the U.S. Navy. In particular, it looks 
at current and future possibilities for cooperation with the United States to meet shared 
security concerns in the Eastern Pacific. The current position of the U.S. on the world 
stage makes it essential that the Navy be able to monitor and respond to maritime threats 
and/or emergencies anywhere on the globe. The U.S. cannot maintain its global naval 
commitments alone. Hence, the concept of the Thousand-Ship-Navy was born and 
securing the cooperation of allied navies has become a significant priority for the United 
States Navy.  
Understanding the hurdles that need to be overcome to achieve cooperation 
between two maritime states that have had conflicts in the past is crucial to building an 
effective alliance that will in turn allow for the operation in concert with U.S. Navy goals 
and action. This thesis will assist Navy planners and operational commanders with 
insights to promote effective cooperation with partner states like Chile and Peru. 
The study of Chile and Peru offers interesting aspects for study in security 
relations and naval cooperation. The first one is willingness, as the literature will show, 
Chile is very willing to engage in security cooperation with the United States and Peru’s 
willingness is tempered by a reluctance which centers around ‘sovereignty’. As is often 
the case in other parts of the world (in fact, Latin America as a whole has limited 
experience of inter-state warfare compared to elsewhere), the navies of Chile and Peru 
have gone to war with one another. The War of the Pacific (1879-1883) had clear and 
definite objectives – the gain of resource rich land for Chile and the loss of land by Peru, 
as well as the loss of access to the sea for Bolivia, all of which remain sources of 
contention to this day. U.S. interests may require international partners that do not always 




Sea. Also at issue is how nation-states that seek to expand their influence might react to 
U.S. efforts to deepen naval cooperation. A greater role for these rising naval powers will 
mean more power for them, and the more the United States depends on them, the less 
influence it might have in that region. Finally, we can learn lessons about how to enable 
navies, characterized by different levels of professionalism and capabilities, to work 
together in a shared maritime area of operations. 
B. GLOBAL CONTEXT  
Today, the oceans of the world, like the situation on land, provide an arena of 
operations for terrorism, political and religious extremism, weapons proliferation 
including weapons of mass destruction, trade disruption, environmental attack, human 
smuggling and slavery, banditry, illegal immigration, illegal drug trafficking, smuggling 
and piracy.1 To put the maritime domain in perspective it is important to note the fact 
that: worldwide about 80% of the world’s trade is transported by sea by over 50,000 large 
ships each year. It is also the way in which about 1.9 billion tons of petroleum is shipped 
worldwide – approximately 60% of the world’s petroleum.2 Trade is the lifeblood that 
feeds the economies of seagoing nations. To preserve their way of life and grow in the 
21st century the legitimate use of the sea must not only be maintained, but improved 
upon. 
This leads to the realization that no country, not even the U.S. can do it alone. 
Maritime security, being an international problem, requires an international solution. No 
single nation has the resources, capacity, sovereignty, or control over the assets, or 
venues from which transnational threats endanger global security.3 In this situation we 
are faced with the need to embrace international collaboration to secure the seas, which, 
in turn, led to the development of the Thousand-Ship-Navy concept. The Thousand-Ship- 
Navy concept envisions a voluntary coalition of the navies of the world that engage in the 
                                                 
1 John G. Morgan and Charles W. Martoglio, “The 1,000 Ship Navy Global Maritime Network,” 






development of a network that vastly increases the number of sensors to monitor the 
security of the world’s oceans while increasing the number of available units capable of 
responding to any matter pertaining to maritime security.4 To date, the U.S. Navy has 
largely focused on the technical challenges of developing these monitoring and response 
networks – for example, building the combined command, control, communications, 
computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) platforms that need to 
be in place for effective navy-to-navy cooperation and working out equipment 
interoperability issues in the course of joint exercises.  
Just as important, if not more so, is determining whether partner navies are 
willing and able to cooperate in the development of these networks. If they are not 
willing at this point, then attention needs to be turned to creating the conditions for 
effective cooperation.  
C. PROBLEMS TO CONSIDER AND HYPOTHESIS 
A study of security issues quickly reveals that there are problems with this 
concept. The first problem the U.S. faces when seeking cooperation in maritime security 
from partner countries is willingness. If some countries view certain actions as a violation 
of the sovereignty of another state and they have a policy of “not meddling in other 
country’s matters,” where do countries draw the line between the activities that countries 
are willing to support? How aggressive are these countries going to be in stopping, 
boarding and searching vessels that carry other nations’ flags of convenience? 
The next problem after willingness is actual capability. If given information on a 
probable surface vessel that is engaged in illicit activities, piracy or contributing to 
terrorism, can one of our partner navies respond in time to a designated point in their area 
of responsibility where the vessel is, and effectively interdict that vessel? This includes 
the issue of how fuel costs are likely to affect cooperation. How much equipment and 
resources are nations able and willing to invest in securing the Eastern Pacific, when they 
all have competing national goals vying for limited funds? Is a U.S. financing of oil 
                                                 




going to be required in certain security operations for them to take place, like the U.S. 
paying all partner nations’ fuel bills during the UNITAS exercise to achieve maximum 
participation? 
The hypothesis I submit is that there is a point of mutual concordance, a “sweet 
spot,” where the security concerns of these three countries meet. What needs to be 
determined is where the point of mutual concordance for the U.S., Chile and Peru is in 
relation to the Eastern Pacific. These three nation’s goals will have to be set in a 
framework that generates agreement and resolves differences for security cooperation to 
work. To the degree that the U.S. can help fill gaps in capability, in ways that are 
mutually beneficial and non-threatening to both Chile and Peru, then we can garner a 
higher degree of cooperation. Following the resolution of these issues, a deepening of 
security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific could mean that our partners will assume the 
role that the limited U.S. assets may not be able to perform on a continuous basis. 
To address the problems and possibilities of naval cooperation in the Eastern 
Pacific this thesis seeks to identify the national perspective, the regional issues and 
discuss the process of harmonizing these to enhance naval security cooperation. Chapter 
II is a literature review that will discuss the concept of the Thousand-Ship-Navy and how 
it calls for the navies of the world to participate voluntarily in a program of mutually 
shared goals of security and stability for the maritime domain. Next, we will see that one 
likely vehicle for this concept to be implemented is the Maritime Domain Awareness 
(MDA) initiative. MDA seeks to maximize the number of sensors to gain intelligence 
about what happens in the world’s oceans. MDA is a highly collaborative effort across 
many agencies, including military, law enforcement, state agencies and private enterprise 
and that has different structures and responsibilities at the tactical, operational and 
strategic level. 
Chapter III will discuss Chile and its history, specifically its naval history to 
illustrate that Chile is a seagoing country whose long strip of land depends on the sea to 
accomplish its national objectives. It will discuss the Armada de Chile of today along 




discussed to see how the concept of ‘Mar Presencial,’ which calls for the outward 
expansion of Chile into the sea as an inherent right and responsibility, is now able to take 
hold and be implemented with the capacity that Chile now possesses to implement such a 
strategy. 
Chapter IV will discuss Peru and its history and show that it too is a country with 
a proud maritime tradition, whose economy is also highly dependent on the sea for 
growth and economic prosperity. The Marina de Guerra del Peru also has a long history 
of participation with the U.S. Navy: it is the only nation with which our forces practice 
their submarine hunting skills outside of a simulator. The politics of Peru that include the 
rise of an outsider into the presidency, Alberto Fujimori, and its impact on the political 
landscape of Peru still has reverberations to this day. As such, Peru has more of an 
inward focus than perhaps the United States or Chile at this point, even though they do 
demonstrate willingness to be an active participant in naval security cooperation efforts in 
the Eastern Pacific. 
Chapter V addresses the United States and their history in Latin America, from 
the Monroe Doctrine, to the Cold War, the War on Drugs and our current war against 
terrorism. It will analyze the documents that delineate U.S. policy and lay the foundation 
for international naval security cooperation, National Security Strategy, National Defense 
Strategy and National Strategy for Maritime Security. This will include examples of 
naval security cooperation around the world, as well as examples from the SOUTHCOM 
theater: such as Enduring Friendship and Global Fleet Station. 
Chapter VI is the conclusion and it will discuss to what we can expect in the near 
future in naval security cooperation between the United States, Chile and Peru and what 








II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. SECURITY COMMUNITIES 
Adler and Barnett suggest that security communities share “values, norms and 
symbols that provide a social identity, and engage in various interactions in myriad 
spheres that reflect long-term interest, diffuse reciprocity, and trust.”5 While this 
statement is meant to refer to states, for our purposes it can be applied directly to the 
navies of the United States, Chile and Peru. The navies of these three countries share very 
similar values. The U.S. Navy holds Honor, Courage and Commitment as its values; the 
Chilean Navy (Armada de Chile) has Honor, Professionalism, Loyalty and Willingness to 
Sacrifice6 as their values; and the Peruvian Navy (Marina de Guerra del Peru) reflects 
similar values in their motto “Only one north, duty, only one course, honor.”7 Here we 
have three institutions in three separate states which share the fundamental values of 
Honor, Duty and Professionalism, that have been brought up through their respective 
naval academies and commissioning sources to have similar if not identical norms and 
symbols that provide a social identity that transcends borders. The U.S. Navy has lent 
support to both the Chilean and Peruvian Navy in setting up and training their submarine 
and naval aviation arms and they have participated in many maritime exercises over the 
past decades such as UNITAS, PASSEX and PANAMAX, thus implying their long-term 
interest, reciprocity and trust. 
Conceptually the security community “exists at the international level…whenever 
states become integrated to the point that they have a sense of community; which in turn, 
creates the assurance that they will settle their differences short of war, (which creates) a 
                                                 
5 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, Security Communities (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 3. 
6 Fundamentos Valoricos de Nuestra Armada de Chile (Fundamental Values of the Chilean Navy), 
http://www.armada.cl/arm_rumbo/site/artic/20030512/pags/20030512183405.html. 
7 “Un solo norte, el deber, un solo rumbo, el honor” in El Monitor, the Official publication of the 





stable peace.”8 The Chilean and Peruvian navies both have the assurance that the U.S. 
Navy will not conduct hostile actions against either of these two navies and more 
importantly, it is becoming apparent that the Chilean and Peruvian navies will not engage 
each other militarily. This is important because the navies of Chile and Peru did go to war 
with one another during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883). This war had clear and 
definite implications – the gain of resource rich land for Chile and the loss of land by 
Peru and the loss of access to the sea for Bolivia, realities that are still part of 
consciousness of these countries to this day. However, there is evidence that they will 
solve their differences peacefully. For example, a current maritime boundary dispute 
between Chile and Peru is the subject of a lawsuit before the International Court of 
Justice at The Hague.9  
“Some states are revising the concept of power to include the ability of a 
community to defend its values and expectations of proper behavior against an external 
threat and to attract new states with the ideas that convey a sense of national security and 
material progress.”10 The navies of the world are paying attention and following the lead 
of the U.S. Navy Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) “Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower,” presented at the International Seapower Symposium held at 
Newport, RI on October 17, 2007. This cooperative strategy emphasizes that our oceans 
are essential to global commerce and our way of life, with 80% of the world’s people 
living near a coast and 90% of our world’s commerce moving by sea, therefore making 
maritime forces a critical element in providing global security and stability. Chile has 17 
ports on which it relies for over 80% of its trade and Peru has 14 ports, which also 
provides a high percentage of its trade. Securing the seas to promote the economic and 
material progress of these countries as well as increasing national security by thwarting 
any terrorist or illegal activity is in the interest and purview of the three navies. 
                                                 
8 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 3. 
9 Xinhua, Peru, Chile Locked in Maritime Territory Dispute, January 19, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content_7451066.htm. 




While we have examined security communities, a pluralistic security community 
“retains the legal independence of separate governments. These states within the 
pluralistic security community posses a compatibility of core values derived from 
common institutions, and a mutual responsiveness – a matter of mutual identity and 
loyalty, a sense of “we-ness.”11 While we have already mentioned the compatibility of 
core values, these three navies also have common institutions, from naval academies and 
enlisted training schools, to the staff and operational commands that provide very closely 
matched divisions of labor and expertise across these three navies. Naval officers of the 
United States, Chile and Peru are more alike than are civilians in the three countries. 
Furthermore, none of them views their counterparts as “the adversary” they are preparing 
to fight and defeat in battle. Chile and Peru have displayed a mutual responsiveness to 
perform Search and Rescue operations (SAR) in their territorial waters and willingly 
accept support from each other’s navies for this purpose. Both the Chilean and Peruvian 
government agree that the prevention of loss of life is of paramount importance, as it 
would be a blow to national prestige to have people die in your territorial waters because 
naval assistance could not arrive in time. A cooperative framework that allows Peruvian 
naval assets in Chilean waters and vice versa is already in place in this regard. Thus, the 
East Pacific is engendering a sense of “we-ness” between the Chilean and Peruvian 
navies and as a worldwide maritime power with the U.S. Navy as well. 
“Communication is the cement of social groups in general and political 
communities in particular.”12 The navies of these three countries are constantly 
communicating, perhaps better than the states themselves, because even when relations 
between states turn cold, military-to-military programs remain in place. They provide the 
constant communications between officers who spend twenty or more years working 
together versus political players who can fade in or out of the scene in relatively quick 
bursts. Technically this issue is being addressed, as some of the most important problems 
these navies are trying to iron out are interoperability, command-and-control and 
                                                 





networks. The first and most important challenge associated with joint endeavors in the 
Eastern Pacific is going to be interoperability, “the ability of systems, units, or forces to 
provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the 
services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together.”13  
The second issue is command-and-control. How do you delineate tasking? How 
do you get assets to where they are needed? What are the communication methods that 
going to be used so that information can be delivered transparently and securely across 
the board between the U.S., Chile and Peru? The U.S. Navy is thinking about and 
addressing these communication questions. Significantly, they are not just building on the 
military-to-military program level, but also the ships at sea level and across the three 
navies, so that Third Fleet in San Diego could communicate and relay information to the 
Chilean and Peruvian navies directly. 
According to Charles L. Munns, one of the ways to enable communication among 
these three nation’s navies is through networks. “Networks have enabled quantum leaps 
in capabilities because they rapidly move things to those who can use them.”14 The 
biggest challenge with networks is interoperability - are all the computers in the network 
using the same language and are the systems compatible for information exchange. This 
includes the interoperability of U.S. assets with foreign navies and organizations. In fact, 
as former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated, “possibly the single most 
transforming thing in our force will not be a weapon system, but a set of interconnections 
and a substantially enhanced capability because of that awareness.”15 This leads to the 
realization that “one of the biggest obstacles to realizing an effective partnership is 




                                                 
13 DoD interoperability definition, http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2002sba/garber.pdf. 
14 Charles L. Munns, “The Big Network Could Save Your Life,” Proceedings, September 2004, 56. 




compatible command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and 
reconnaissance (C4ISR) that will facilitate a true network and make the partnership a 
reality?”16 
Galdorisi and Hszieh state that international security cooperation demands that its 
international partners “be as interoperable as possible. Not being interoperable means you 
are not on the net, so you are not in a position to derive power from the information 
age.”17 The number one issue to achieve this goal is coalition communications.18 The 
preferred method would be some kind of network at the “sensitive but unclassified level 
where possible” for all coalition partners to participate in an ensure interoperability.19 So 
far we have three efforts underway to help achieve this. They are: 1) Combined 
Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIX) – “a global information-
sharing network established in 2002,”20 2) The Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP) – 
“a forum for defense science and technology collaboration between Australia, Canada, 
New Zealand, the UK and the U.S.,”21 and 3) FORCE Net – “the operational construct 
and architectural framework for Naval Warfare in the information age, to integrate 
WARRIORS, sensors, networks, command-and-control, platforms, and weapons into a 
networked, distributed combat force, scalable across the spectrum of conflict from seabed 
to space and sea to land.”22 If coalition partners make themselves FORCE Net 
compatible, and it appears that this is not yet a reality, then there would be an increase in 
interoperability. 
The region already has been introduced to at least one model of security 
cooperation by ADM James Stavridis, Commander, U.S. Southern Command 
                                                 
16 George Galdorisi and Stephanie Hszieh, “Speaking the Same Language,” Proceedings, March 2008, 
57. 









(SOUTHCOM). His vision for this area of operations emphasizes that. “We need more 
relevant fusion technologies that allow all-source fusion, distributed dissemination, 
collaborative planning, and multiple-node sensor resource management. But we can’t 
keep such a system to ourselves; we need a system for precision-guided intelligence that 
we can share with our partners.”23 Stavridis then notes that the establishment of 
CENTRIXS has been underway in the Americas since 2006. Furthermore, “the 
foundation of the Maritime Domain Awareness effort will be an unclassified common 
operational picture available via the Internet to all participants in the initiative.”24 
This is important because the literature states transactions have to be “not only 
with the elites but also the masses, instilling in them a sense of community.”25 As the 
navies work together, it will not just be Admirals talking to one another at embassy 
functions, but junior officers in the different ships and command centers for these three 
navies in the Eastern Pacific entering into direct communication. Further, the security 
community “perspective relies on shared knowledge, ideational forces, and a dense 
normative environment.”26 This is precisely the type of cooperation for the three navies 
that would strengthen their collective presence in the Eastern Pacific. Successful 
implementation of this approach would involve the shared knowledge of all commercial 
assets and targets of interest by all three navies. All three navies have a commitment to 
the ideology of security and stability in the maritime theater and are equally determined 
to thwart the threat presented by terrorists and the illegal drug trade in their areas of 
responsibility. Navies operate in a dense normative environment as a matter of routine. In 
this case, with three navies and the international implications that can result from their 
actions, we can expect an even more normative framework when these three navies 
operate together than we they operate independently in their own territorial waters for 
matters of their own national security that does not involve the partner nations. 
                                                 
23 James Stavridis, “Sailing in Southern Waters,” Proceedings, May 2007, 21. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Adler and Barnett, Security Communities, 7.  




Adler and Barnett address four implications for security communities. First is the 
concept of an international community. Second is the “examination of the relationship 
between the transnational forces, state power, and security politics in novel ways.”27 
Third is the relation between transactions and interactions, which “generate reciprocity, 
new forms of trust, the discovery of new interests, and even collective identities.”28 
Finally, security communities imply the possibility of shifting from a realist perspective 
into an idealist one. 
When the CNO invites the navies of the world to participate in this new concept 
of the Thousand-Ship-Navy with its equal weight partner nations, it is the beginning of a 
maritime international community. Second, when these navies band together to increase 
their security and stability against common threats they agree upon, mainly terrorism and 
transnational crime, they have joined state power in a new and novel way. Third, these 
interactions are generating a collective maritime identity for the world’s navies and the 
effective implementation of this concept requires trust on the partner navies. The element 
of reciprocity will have to wait until we have better data to see how this initiative affects 
the interactions of these navies and states. Fourth, when states that have gone to war in 
the past, as in the case of Chile and Peru, and who militarily see each other as an unlikely 
but plausible threat in the theater, can start working together for joint security goals, we 
are effectively shifting from a realist to an idealist perspective. Otherwise, a terrorist or 
criminal threat that weakens one state is good for the other state, because their relative 
power is increased while the power of the state expending resources to deal with the 
threat is diminished. This is not an alliance in the traditional sense, because they are not 
balancing against another power, but rather working together under the premise, the idea, 
of joint maritime common goals of security, stability and trade. 
Adler and Barnett provide a three-tiered framework for security communities. The 
first tier, or what they call a nascent security community, is when “precipitating factors 
encourage states to orient themselves in each other’s direction and coordinate their 
                                                 





policies.”29 The second tier, or an ascendant security community, “consists of the 
‘structural’ elements of power and ideas, and the ‘process’ elements of transactions, 
international organizations and social learning.”30 The third tier, or mature security 
community, is “the development of trust and collective identity formation.”31  
The literature review to this point suggests that the navies of the United States, 
Chile and Peru are effectively engaged in a tier-two security community and that this in 
turn brings the countries into a tier-one security community. For the navies of the world 
the first-tier is already being addressed with the precipitating conditions being 
international terrorism and criminal organizations that operate in the seas. This has 
allowed the states and specifically their navies to orient themselves around one another 
and coordinate their policy into a joint security environment. Presently, the navies of the 
world, and in particular the United States, Chile and Peru, find themselves in the middle 
of the tier two process of becoming an ascendant security community. The structural 
element is in place with the commitment of the strategic policy makers of these three 
navies to the idea of a joint maritime security environment and in each of them willing to 
back this idea with the power and assets of their respective navies. This is critical, 
agreement to an idea means nothing until assets and relationships are put in place to turn 
the ideas into action. The process elements are being closely addressed by the review of 
technical hurdles that are needed to make this concept work to include interoperability, 
command-and-control issues, and networks that these three navies can communicate and 
operate with in the Eastern Pacific. This is a key point and makes clear why this really is 
the realization of a nascent security community. It is one thing to engage in exercises and 
war games were navies play and interact for a very definite period of time, for example 
commencement of exercise to its termination, and another to have a standing working 
relationship with the expectation of continuity. To make this a reality these three navies 
need to find the way to have the structural and process elements integrated at the 
                                                 






operational level. While the ships of these three navies can talk bridge to bridge when 
they are in radio range of each other, it is another different matter to have Third Fleet in 
San Diego in contact with Valparaiso in Chile and Callao in Peru in regards to the 
security of the Eastern Pacific. This would be a new level of naval security and 
cooperation, in the absence of war, which has no parallel anywhere in history. This will 
also be an example of the noncontiguous nature of security communities where members 
do not have to be in proximity of one another. While Peru and Chile are bordering states, 
for the United States these two partners are noncontiguous and are similar to the security 
community that  United States has with Israel and Australia.  
Two ideas that foster tier two security communities in today’s world are 
liberalism and democracy.32 In the case of United States, Chile and Peru, this can be 
translated into economic liberalism, with its free trade, lowering of trade barriers, and 
unhampered flow of capital across borders to stimulate economic growth and foreign 
investment, which has been a key economic policy in boosting Chile’s economy and one 
that Peru is emulating to some degree. The widespread implementation of the 
“Washington Consensus” in the 1990s in Latin America did not bring about the great 
economic transformation across the region that was expected. However, it did provide the 
tools for some countries to emerge victorious from the debt crisis of the 1980s and to 
learn the lessons and state controls they need to implement to have a continued economic 
upward spiral. Some countries, however, continue to challenge economic liberalism. The 
most prominent figure in this wider challenge has been Venezuela’s President, Hugo 
Chávez. He argues that Latin America has not been able to prosper because of the 
“imperialist agenda” imposed by the United States on the region and that the answer to 
economic prosperity lies in the implementation of a socialist state that nationalizes 
foreign investments and has the government impose aggressive controls on the economy. 
Chile and Peru, though both have passed through periods of military dictatorships, are 
now fully functioning democracies, that even though they are currently ruled by elected  
 
                                                 




leaders of the left, still hold the value of democracy dear. This again can be contrasted 
with other governments in the areas that favor a hard line socialist government with 
actions being taken to erode democracy in favor of more authoritarian institutions. 
B. VISION FOR NAVAL SECURITY COOPERATION 
In 2005, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, then the U.S. Navy’s Chief of Naval 
Operations, coined the Thousand-Ship-Navy term to address the security and stability of 
the world’s ocean in a collective and collaborative effort with the world’s navies. In his 
statements, Mullen indicated that the U.S. Navy cannot preserve the freedom of the 
world’s waterways by itself and called upon the assistance of like-minded navies to 
participate in this initiative for global maritime security.33 
Ronald Ratcliff offers insights by citing ADM Mullen in stating that this 
thousand-ship navy would serve as an international maritime force composed of not only 
the world’s navies, but also the world’s coast guards, seaborne shipping enterprises, 
nongovernmental bodies and some governmental agencies. While concerns about 
sovereignty can negatively impact some navies predisposition to participate in this joint 
venture the U.S. Navy has spread forth the message that participation would be on a 
strictly voluntary basis and in an ad hoc fashion. The idea is to create a global maritime 
navy that protects the lifeblood of most countries economic development, trade, by 
allowing it to flow unencumbered and freely.34 
The public statements of the U.S. Navy have established ten guiding principles. 
First, and most important, is the principle of respect for national sovereignty at all times. 
Second, nations and their maritime components, to include navies, coast guards and 
maritime shipping, would participate when they have common interests. Third, the focus 
of this endeavor is maritime security and the maritime domain. This includes 
international straits and the high seas and the more nation focused areas of territorial 
waters, ports and harbors. Fourth, the recognition in the international stage that no one 
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nation, in this case the United States can do everything or be everywhere it needs to be at 
the same time, but that all participating nations can contribute something significant. 
Fifth, the thousand-ship navy would be an integrated network of commercial maritime 
elements such as port operators and commercial shippers, local law enforcement agencies 
from the host countries and the international navies and coast guards. Sixth, the idea or 
expectation that the more developed nations or navies will help increase the ability and 
capacity of the less capable ones in the network. Seventh, U.S. assistance would only be 
provided if it was asked for, by the nation or navy concerned. Eighth, is the development 
of regional maritime networks. Ninth, the dissemination of information to a wide 
audience is considered a key element for effectiveness, transparency and efficiency, and 
as such there will be an effort to keep classified maritime intelligence to a minimum. 
Finally, this is not a short term or easy fix, rather a long-term effort that will require 
commitment from the world’s navies and the time to start is now.35 
Two key objectives for facilitating the free flow of trade among nations and 
protecting the world’s maritime domain are as follows. Increased “maritime domain 
awareness” which involves the free transfer of information among the world’s navies 
about anything in the maritime realm and the capability to respond to situations as they 
arise, be they crises, emergencies or targets of opportunity by positioning assets where 
they count.36 
C. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES AND FEEDBACK 
While the idea of global maritime cooperation might be a novel concept, 
international maritime cooperation is not. There are numerous examples, such as: 
MALSINDO, a counter-piracy agreement between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore; 
Task Force 150, which has had the participation of United States, Canada, Denmark, 
Pakistan, Germany, France, United Kingdom, Australia, Italy, Turkey, Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Portugal and Spain, for operations in and around the North Arabian Sea and 
                                                 





Indian Ocean; and the Indonesian tsunami relief efforts carried out in 2004-2005. At the 
same time, there has been a clear lack of support among the international community for 
the U.S. Navy approach to naval security cooperation using the Thousand-Ship-Navy. 
Three reasons have been offered to explain its lack of support on the world stage. First, 
there needs to be a sufficient investment of the intellectual, administrative and monetary 
resources to attain the goals of the program. Second, it is suggested in the literature that 
the U.S. Navy does not fully understand the nature and the challenges involved in 
creating a global maritime endeavor in what has been called the “tragedy of the 
commons.”37 This “tragedy of the maritime commons” is the belief among nations that 
while securing the maritime environment does benefit everyone, it benefits the richer 
countries the most by keeping trade open and their economies growing. From this 
perspective, the plight of the poorer countries are ignored at the same time as they are 
asked to commit limited resources in tasks that do not help their pressing concerns, like 
human trafficking or waterborne pandemics, but that help the richer countries of the word 
get richer.38 The third obstacle the thousand-ship navy concept has to overcome is the 
fact that the U.S. Navy has not made this concept part of the current maritime strategy. 
Some nations have interpreted this as a sign of a lack of commitment on the part of the 
United States.39 
However, while the U.S. has made clear that it will not be dictating terms to other 
nations and navies, it expects to provide the leadership role for this concept to succeed. 
Critical to this effort will be the ability to coordinate actions between participating units 
and the influx to all participating units of current and actionable intelligence. The U.S. 
Navy must show and demonstrate how it plans to accomplish these two actions, 
coordination and intelligence, if it wants to generate greater buy-in from the world’s 
navies.40 
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D. CHALLENGES TO BE OVERCOME 
There are four critical challenges to overcome. First is the building of trust. More 
specifically, what needs to be addressed is the idea that this is a push for the United States 
to secure its homeland by interfering with other nations’ sovereignty at sea. The historic 
rivalries between countries, as well as the suspicion of other nations’ true intentions, also 
need to be overcome. The list of countries with differences that might affect their 
contribution to a global maritime effort is large, for example, India and Pakistan, China 
and India, Japan and Korea, China and Japan, China and Southeast Asia, Asia and 
Australia, Argentina and Chile and the United States and Venezuela. The second 
challenge has to do with capacity and capability. Most of the navies of the world are 
designed for operations close to its littorals such as border and customs patrol, monitoring 
fisheries and other economic maritime interests. They are not designed, nor are they 
proficient in anti-terrorist operations or in stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction. By the same token, the U.S. Navy and its carrier-centric stance is not the best 
navy to address littoral concerns around the world. The third challenge is jurisprudence. 
Domestic and international law regarding conduct at sea can dovetail and create legal 
vagaries that undermine a global maritime partnership. Individual navies or commanders 
may be impeded from acting by sovereign authorities and undermine the thousand-ship 
navy concept. The last challenge is communication, while most ships can communicate 
ship to ship via VHR radios, new technologies offer many channels and for a maritime 
domain awareness strategy relying on the free and unimpeded flow of information and 
actionable intelligence in a “common operating picture” that is seen by all will require 
more than radio circuits and web portals. Lack of information for a couple of hours can 
destroy and undermine any chance for a successful coordinated action among many 
international players.41  
                                                 




E. STEPS TO IMPROVE BUY IN 
While the challenges are being overcome, there are six key steps that the U.S. 
Navy can take to make the thousand-ship navy a reality. First is to make it a priority and 
have it reflected in the U.S. maritime strategy. Other countries are not going to make a 
commitment to the Thousand-Ship-Navy unless they see that the United States is serious 
enough about it to make it part of the way it does business. Second will be the delineation 
of clear guidelines about the structure of the Thousand-Ship-Navy. The ad hoc nature of 
the Thousand-Ship-Navy and its non-committal arrangements are meant to minimize 
barriers to participation. Establishing a rudimentary command structure dividing the 
world’s oceans into defined operating areas and pointing out regional powers for nominal 
leadership would help as well as establishing basic rules of engagement. Third, Ratcliff 
recommends a focus on thousand-ship navy over the Global Fleet Station ship concept. 
Instead of a Global Fleet Station ship you could have a thousand ship navy fleet station 
ship under U.S. administrative control to show U.S. commitment and test 
communications, operating concepts and command-and-control procedures. The Global 
Fleet Station will be visited later in this paper. Fourth is to make the U.S. Coast Guard a 
vital element for the Thousand-Ship-Navy. Fifth, the U.S. Navy must be able to provide 
its partners in the Thousand-Ship-Navy a portal through which all players can have 
access to the same information and a common operating picture. Finally, the United 
States must take steps to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) within the near future.42 
The Maritime Domain Awareness concept could “operationalize” the Thousand 
Ship-Navy. Lloyd’s of London estimates that the world’s maritime domain has to 
contend with 89,000 ships, in the 100-ton to 565,000-ton range, manned by a multitude of 
seafarers from every nationality and flying the flags of 150 nations.43 Maritime Domain 
Awareness will require the integration of all open-source data and intelligence to 
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maintain visibility on those 89,000 ships. For this venture to be effective information 
must be both accurate and immediately transferred across international boundaries and 
across varying levels of state, military, law enforcement and private enterprise. In the 
SOUTHCOM theater the Panama Canal is one of those critical chokepoints in the 
maritime domain through which 13,000 to 14,000 transoceanic vessels pass, ferrying with 
them approximately five percent of the world’s trade.44  
Authors such as Kevin D. Long put forth the notion that examples for Thousand–
Ship-Navy style cooperation other than MDA already exist and one of those is the Global 
Fleet Station concept. In the Global Fleet Station concept maritime elements from the 
civilian, coast guards and navies from partner-countries join together to achieve common 
interests and cross-training. The HSV-2 SWIFT, a wave-piercing catamaran with speeds 
up almost 50 knots, has been picked as the USN ship for this pilot program in the 
SOUTHCOM theater where multi-agency and multi-national entities will work together 
to strengthen naval security cooperation in the Caribbean and Atlantic.45 We will look at 
the Global Fleet Station concept in further detail in the U.S. chapter. 
F. MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS  
Long states that Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is an effort to gain 
knowledge of everything that happens in the maritime domain to include vessels, cargo, 
passengers and the anomalies that could signify danger on a global scale to maintain the 
security of the United States. Further Long clarifies that this is an outgrowth of the U.S. 
Coast Guard’s Special Interest Vessel (SIV) tracking program, which is supposed to track 
vessels and their approach to the United States. After the attacks on 9/11, it grew in 
scope, size and objectives to keep the homeland safe from any kind of threat that affects 
security to include terrorist attacks. One of the key aspects of MDA is its inter-agency 
bias from the design and its multiple liaisons across state, military, law enforcement and 
civilian sectors. All these agencies will have to agree on how to create, design, and 
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implement a Common Operational Picture (COP). They will also have to decide what 
their contributions and responsibilities will be to this venture. While MDA is new, the 
concept of ship tracking by various agencies is not new, as the U.S. Navy, U.S. Coast 
Guard, Law Enforcement and other maritime intelligence agencies have worked jointly in 
the past regarding the security of the maritime sector.46 
We can analyze the infrastructure of MDA at the tactical, operational and 
strategic level. At the tactical level, Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOCs) have been 
created where the Navy, Coast Guard and other multi-agency partners can focus their 
attentions on individual ports and specific areas. At the operational level, the Maritime 
Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFCs) which were created by the U.S. Coast Guard and 
have the ability to fuse with other agencies like Department of Homeland Defense (DHS) 
and Department of Defense (DoD). The best place to handle the strategic level is the 
Navy’s National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC). Worldwide analysis of shipping 
and maritime activity is carried out here. The key will be in establishing a common 
operating protocol that will feed the tactical, operational and strategic levels with the 
appropriate information in a timely manner. Then further thought will have to be given as 
to how our international partners can contribute and at what level.47 
R. B. Watts states that one thing that needs to be made clear is that MDA is about 
information gathering at a grand scale. While this information could lead to actions 
carried out by DHS or DoD operational forces, that is not the purpose of MDA. MDA is 
not an effort to take operational control over forces operating on the seas, either ours or 
partners navies operating under Thousand-Ship-Navy frameworks. What MDA seeks to 
gain is intelligence. This includes manifests, crew lists, merchant activity recreational 
boating, port activity and other peripheral activities, combined with information about 
potential threats, to create a global and comprehensive picture.48 There are a number of 
angles though which strategic planners can view threats to the United States emanating 
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from the maritime realm. Those looking to protect the country from terrorist threats from 
the sea must contend with 95,000 miles of coastline, 3.4 million square miles in the U.S. 
maritime domain, 1000 ports and harbors, 21,000 daily containers that carry 100% of our 
petroleum imports, 76 million recreational boaters and six million cruise ship 
passengers.49 A significant disruption to the ports and harbors can affect the United 
States unrestricted access to the sea, and this in turn can affect the ability to project 
national power.50 
The bottom line is that MDA is a way to find these threats in the maritime 
domain. These threats can hide or avoid detection from sensors due to the challenges 
provided by coastal land masses, sea states and weather. These considerations then have 
to be considered in relation to the fact that any sea-going vessel could be used for terrorist 
attacks against the United States, from bringing in terrorist operatives to carrying 
Weapons of Mass Destruction into our shores. These actions will likely start in foreign 
ports overseas and this is why MDA has to be a global effort. MDA currently brings 16 
departments and agencies that are able to fuse all their intelligence into one coherent 
picture. The goal of this activity is to accurately detect, localize, classify and target 
suspect vessels before they can be engaged. This will include information of the vessels, 
their cargo, their crews, their passengers and their intended routes.51  
There is a five-stage process to MDA, which is surveillance, detection, tracking, 
classification and targeting. In this manner, threats can be separated from the thousands 
of vessels operating in the seas for legitimate purposes. Surveillance is the observation of 
all activity in the Area of Responsibility or Area of Interest. In the maritime domain, it 
includes the air and undersea responsibilities. Detection is the indication by one of the 
sensors that a potential threat exists in the surveillance area. Tracking applies to any 
element in the surveillance area, neutral or not, where the known positions are recorder 
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and displayed and estimated future position based on course and speed is estimated. 
Tracking allows decision makers to monitor, interdict or destroy the treat. Classification 
determines vessels from each other, friendly, foe, hostile, white shipping, etc and each 
classification has different rules of engagement that can determine courses of actions. For 
example, a vessel that is suspect of terrorist activities can be monitored, but it is only 
when a vessel is declared hostile that it can be fired upon. Targeting is the evaluation of 
vessels in the surveillance area and determining the level of risk and intentions. The end 
result is to push the envelop on potential threats to the United States as far away from 
continental coast as possible.52 
G. JOINT HARBOR OPERATIONS CENTER  
The tactical level of MDA is focused on the 30-40 miles offshore and the 
maritime approaches to the United States and its ports and harbors. Before 9/11 this 
tactical responsibility laid in the hands of the U.S. Coast Guard in the two roles of either 
a Captain of the Port (COTP) with a respective Marine Safety Office (MSO) responsible 
for regulatory functions such as licensing, vessel inspections and environmental 
responses or a “Group” that handled search and rescue, fisheries enforcement and counter 
narcotics. After 9/11 Sector Command Centers (SCC) were designed to join the Group 
and MSO functions under one banner with multi-agency cooperation. When DoD stepped 
into the mix a special SCC called the Joint Harbor Operations Center (JHOC). San Diego 
and Norfolk became the first two JHOCs of the United States with the goal of working 
towards tactical level MDA. The JHOCs seeks to fuse information from U.S. Coast 
Guard, U.S. Navy, Law Enforcement, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Harbor 
Police and Port Agencies, Customs and Border Patrol, local Joint Terrorism Task Force, 
and state agencies to form a Common Operating Picture. The San Diego JHOC was able 
to fuse the information from the following systems: border patrol cameras, San Diego 
port control camera system (civilian), USN radar systems, USCG coastal radar, 
Automated Identification System processors and Navy waterside security systems. 
                                                 




Everyone with a stake in the maritime realm has billets in these JHOCS and the liaison 
system established in this center is critical to fuse information from customs, regarding 
vessel tracking, the FBI tracking terrorists and the Navy’s anti-terrorism force protection 
forces.53 
H. MARITIME INTELLIGENCE FUSION CENTERS 
The literature on Maritime Intelligence Fusion Centers (MIFC) is restricted and 
focused mostly in professional channels. Navy authors, such as R.B. Watts, have 
contributed insights in the public domain into MIFC and how they can be used by nations 
to bind international actors together. The relevance of the MIFC will be reinforced in this 
paper’s conclusion. 
MIFCs are best suited to deal with information and intelligence at the operational 
or regional level, often referred to as the Fleet level in naval terms or Agency level in 
state and federal terms. Components of a MIFC include Federal Law Enforcement, FBI, 
Custom Border Patrol (CBP), Coast Guard Intelligence, Naval Criminal Investigative 
Service (NCIS), Joint Inter-Agency Task components, Staff N2 (intelligence) all the way 
up to Fleet/Combatant Commander (COCOM). The MIFC deals with the combined 
intelligence of these groups and agencies and can possess intelligence specialists and 
analysts in the upwards of 50 personnel in order to collect, analyze and disseminate 
intelligence downwards, sideways and up the chain of command.54 
What MIFCs do at the operational level that is missing at the tactical level, i.e., 
JHOCs, is the analysis of all the data and intelligence that is collected in both the short 
and long term that builds into plans for responding to events, attacks and crises. This 
leads the MIFC to conduct a regional analysis incorporating and analyzing intelligence 
from the following sources. First is the field intelligence from all the sources in the AOR. 
Second is the Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) that is collected and fused with other 
sources. Third is the fusion of MIFCs liaisons with USN Fleet Commanders to create one 
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common picture. Fourth is the production of intelligence products that coordinate all of 
the above for use by tactical and field units. To give an example of the level of 
integration at a MIFC here is the list of participating partners at the Pacific Area 
(PACAREA) MIFC: Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency 
(NSA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Naval Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF) 
Whidbey Island, Canadian Maritime Forces Pacific, Commander Third Fleet Battle 
Watch, Joint Intelligence Center Pacific, National Maritime Intelligence Center, MIFC 
Atlantic, NORTHCOM Intelligence Watch, Coast Guard Operational Commands, Joint 
Inter-Agency Task Force South, Royal Canadian Mounted Police, El Paso Intelligence 
Center (EPIC), California Anti-Terrorism Information Center, Air Marine Operations 
Center, Coast Guard Investigative Services, Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), 
“Legacy” Customs, ICE/CBP Intelligence Coordination Center (USCG), and Department 
of Homeland Security.55 
I. NATIONAL MARITIME INTELLIGENCE CENTER 
A key factor is that MDA is about awareness and not operational control of 
military or law enforcement assets’ use at any level. Even though the information 
gathered from MDA can lead to actions, MDA seeks only to extend information 
collection and analysis into the world’s entire maritime domain simultaneously to achieve 
true global awareness.  
This will require a level of complexity and integration that is not as transparent as 
the military model where the JHOCs feed the MIFCs, which in turn feed the NMIC. The 
multitude of agencies and groups involved in this endeavor, with all their different 
cultures, procedures and specific interests will have to collaborate in a new way to 
accomplish the purpose of global maritime domain awareness, which further refined is 
the maritime vehicle to accomplish the goal of protecting the U.S. homeland.56 
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At the strategic level, nations will have NMICs to coordinate, correlate and 
analyze the data from the sources already mentioned at the JHOC and MIFC level. It will 
add important players such as Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity (MCIA), Coast Guard Information Coordination Center (ICC), Drug 
Enforcement Agency (DEA), Department of State, Department of Transportation, 
Department of Commerce (DoC), and the private industry into a coherent whole that 
analyzes and then diffuses intelligence at a global level. It is important to note that this 
effort will not be focused in military naval activity, but rather on the entire international 
transshipment process to include “white” shipping, cargo-container movements, and 
international port activity.57 
One of the end results of a functioning NMIC in MDA would be a COP that 
would feed and link to the MIFCs, JHOCs, and Combatant Commanders. This would 
create a situation where in MIFC’s and JHOCs can immediately benefit from the superior 
resources and analytical resources available at the strategic level while at the same time 
being able to feed the system with recent real time intelligence. This free flow of 
information at the tactical, operational and strategic level allows for the long-term 
analysis of the maritime domain and detect any potential enemy trends. Threats that are 
detected and identified can then be passed down to the operational and tactical levels for 
appropriate action.58 
When Navy battle groups deploy they have a wide array of sensors that are 
collecting during their transit and on-station times that can feed overseas global 
intelligence into the strategic COP. Two other sensors that can be linked to the strategic 
level of MDA are satellites and underwater sensors. The National Security Agency and 
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) have space based reconnaissance and 
surveillance satellites that can feed into the COP along with the Integrated Underwater  
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Surveillance System (IUSS). This is why the multi-agency nature of MDA becomes 
important and why it is paramount to maintain effective liaison channels and manned 
billets at these strategic centers combined with a robust analysis capability.59 
These institutions are not set in stone at the tactical, operational and strategic level 
as MDA is a new and evolving plan. This leads to the question of where do our 
international partners fit in? In the case of Chile and Peru, do we develop tactical level 
centers in the Eastern Pacific or do they feed into the San Diego JHOC? It seems that the 
distances involved from Chile and Peru might preclude it from being used at the tactical 
level for stateside JHOCs. Is the information provided by these navies in a thousand ship 
navy concept using MDA as a vehicle better suited at the operational level or strategic 
level? The answers to these questions and the appropriate structures that will allow them 
to feed into the system and be able to benefit from a COP they can see are open to further 
research. 
                                                 






Chileans have never lost a war or conflict. Chile is building on a basis of 
significant achievements. They view themselves highly, are willing to 
work hard and are self-sufficient. (They can attain a strong position in 
South America) if they can resolve border conflicts with Peru and 
Argentina, which is hampered by a Prussian view of the nation where the 
state is sacred and any loss (of land) is a terrible tragedy.60  
Chile first governed itself with a Junta, beginning in September 18, 1810. One of 
its first acts was to declare Chilean ports open to all ships. However, the Chileans did not 
have a Navy to protect them, thus leaving an Achilles heel in Chile’s defense: the sea.61 
This led to Spanish loyalist attacks from the Viceroyalty of Peru, which were finally 
defeated on February 12, 1817 at Chacabuco near Santiago, Chile. General Bernardo 
O’Higgins, who secured the victory for Chile and later ruled as its governor, “knew that 
without a proper naval force Chile was vulnerable to landing by enemy forces.” 62 This 
led to a national effort to control the seas that remains a basic tenet of Chilean strategy to 
this day. 
The Chilean Navy was first set-up under British auspices when Lord Thomas 
Cochrane, was appointed commander in chief of the Chilean fleet. After the 
independence of Chile was established, the next task for the Chilean navy was to liberate 
Peru from Spanish rule. This tasking included naval gun battles and blockading the port 
of Callao in the Viceroyalty of Peru from Spanish naval forces.63 
Then in 1863, the Spanish took the Chincha Islands from Peru - which were rich 
in guano - blockaded the ports and later imposed heavy sanctions on Chile which led to 
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war with Spain.64 When the war was over, the Chilean economy had been setback, “but 
at the same time the country had finally been made painfully aware that Chile had to 
maintain a Navy to defend her coast.”65 
Chile continued to build is navy and in 1879, it was called to duty again. In this 
year, Bolivia increased taxes on Chilean nitrate mining. The Chileans refused and the 
Bolivian government seized the Chilean assets. The government of Peru signed a secret 
alliance with Bolivia and the War of the Pacific ensued when Chile declared war on 
Peru.66 After fierce naval warfare between Chile and Peru, Chile emerged victorious and 
secured the Peruvian territories of Tacna and Arica. Bolivia lost its access to the sea. 
These victories and defeats are memories that are alive and well in the present national 
conscience of Chile, Peru and Bolivia. 
The relations between Chile and the U.S. continued to grow and weather the 
occasional ruffle that most countries endure. In 1891, the U.S. and Chile almost went to 
war when two sailors on liberty in Valparaiso where killed. The diplomatic efforts of 
Capt Robley D. Evans convinced the Chileans to compensate the victim’s relatives and 
the matter was resolved.67 In the beginning of the twentieth century, the U.S. would assist 
the Chilean navy in new technologies and tactics that were becoming standard fare in the 
naval realm. Chilean naval aviation started in 1916 with 50 British planes. In 1930 a 
portion of these forces went on to become the Chilean Air Force but the navy retained an 
air arm and “Navy personnel continued to be trained as pilots, mechanics, and 
maintenance personnel and some where sent to U.S. installations.”68 In 1961, the 
Chileans received two “Balao” class submarines from the U.S.69 
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B. CHILEAN POLITICS 
The transition to democracy from the Pinochet regime in Chile allowed the 
Chilean military to “secure extensive institutional safeguards and financial guarantees 
before leaving the government.”70 Nevertheless, Chilean politics have “diminished the 
armed forces’ institutional powers and made policy decisions against military 
preferences.”71 The Chilean government does so while remaining wary of not pushing the 
military beyond a perceived tipping point 
With the specter of human rights issues and their implications for members of the 
military, three shields between the military and civilian government were seen to be put 
in place. The first was “the strong position that the constitution gave it (the military). 
Pinochet had remained as head of the army for eight years after the inaugural democratic 
elections… so that his men would not be touched. A second shield had been the judiciary, 
and the third was the weight of the parties of the Right.”72 Also, the organic law of the 
armed forces prevented the president from eliminating the top commanders of the armed 
forces from service.73 
Some of the moves the government has made to reduce the military’s influence 
were returning the Carabineros to the Interior Ministry. This move helped delineate the 
military’s role along national defense and separate it from internal security matters by 
rejecting the Army’s presence in the Oficina Coordinadora de Seguridad Publica 
(Coordinating Agency of Public Security).74 
Chile’s civilian government strategy has been labeled as deliberate internationalist 
because “governing leaders of a democratizing country prefer to negotiate with 
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adversaries and have cohesive political support that enables politicians to formulate 
serious foreign policy initiatives they are committed to pursue.”75 This strategy is 
accredited to the Concertación coalition that follows cooperative international policies 
instead of exacerbating rivalries with neighbors, as for example with Argentina.76 In the 
case of Peru it is interesting to note the involvement of Chile in the Peruvian economy. 
This creates an intermingling of interests where military action against Peru would hurt 
Chile’s economic pursuits. While not a guarantee for anything, investing in another 
country’s economy is an indicator of an internationalist strategy. 
However, a plausible explanation for Chile’s expanding Naval role despite the 
increasing civilian control of the military and in line with the internationalist strategy is 
the influence of the “Mar Presencial” concept in both naval and political circles. “Mar 
Presencial” was born out of the nationalist writings of Diego Jose Victor Portales in the 
1830s, which proposed that Chile was destined to control the South Pacific.77 Today, 
Chilean government seems to believe that greater usage and control of the South Pacific 
is necessary for Chile’s growth and development.78 The Chilean navy is well fitted in the 
government’s view to fill this role. “The purpose of Mar Presencial is to patrol and 
exploit the defined ocean space so as to protect national interests and contribute to 
Chile’s development. Mar Presencial thus becomes the theoretical basis for possible 
future unilateral action, to be justified under the name of national security.”79 
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The real driving force for “Mar Presencial” is not saber rattling on the part of 
Chile, but rather economic concerns about who controls the high seas and the bounty to 
be generated from it. Control of the sea-bottom resources has been called “oceanopolitics, 
a perception of the ocean as a legitimate are for expanding and developing national 
interest.”80 
Of particular interest are the notions of “sovereignty” and “sovereign rights” over 
the Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZ). “Sovereignty entails full and unquestionable 
ability to act, while sovereign rights reflect a distinct circumscription of the state’s 
authority.”81 The Chilean government is interested in “fishing, scientific research, the 
laying of cables and pipelines, and the construction of artificial islands and 
installations”82 as well as the extensive deposits of underwater gas hydrates that have 
been discovered along the Chilean coast. 
Now that Chile has the naval capability to claim and enforce “Mar Presencial” it 
is becoming a real component of the country’s overall strategy. What may have been a 
nationalistic notion in the past with no means to enforce it has now become an idea 
whose time has come. With all the bounties for economic growth that the sea provides, it 
makes sense for Chile to seek to extend its naval reach and makes it more likely to 
cooperate with the U.S. in any global maritime endeavor. 
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Figure 1.   Mar Presencial83 
                                                 




C. TODAY’S ARMADA DE CHILE 
The Chileans view their navy as having various roles. The first one is to win wars, 
protect the sea and to prepare for war during peace. The second is the perceived duty to 
develop the remote and sparsely populated areas of country with examples as Navarrino 
Island, Easter Island and Antarctic operations.84 The third role is assistance in natural 
disasters. The fourth and final role is assistance to navigators to include Search and 
Rescue.85 
Despite an apparent lack of bilateral exercises between the Chilean and Peruvian 
navy, Chile maintains avid relations with the U.S. According to the Chilean Navy website 
(Armada de Chile), they have participated in the following joint (multi-service – Army, 
Air Force, Navy and Marines) and combined (multi-national) exercises: UNITAS, 
RIMPAC, PANAMAX and various PASSEX.86  
Chile participated in both UNITAS Atlantic and UNITAS Pacific. UNITAS is a 
USSOUTHCOM sponsored multi-national exercise that allows partner navies to 
participate with each other in security cooperation exercises. This allows for improved 
interoperability and the fostering of relations during peacetime that are meant to smooth 
out the human interactions in coalition operations and in future endeavors. This exercise 
is designed to train each of the partner navies in a multitude of maritime scenarios that 
serve to enhance the international standing and proficiency of individual navies as well as 
improve the ability of the region as a whole to address challenges, threats and 
emergencies. Great importance was given to maritime interdiction operations, theater 
security operation, interoperability and establishing security as “a necessary condition for 
prosperity and lasting democratic institutions.”87 
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) is a major maritime exercise intended to “enhance 
the tactical proficiency of participating units in a wide array of combined operations at 
                                                 
84 Zackrison and Meason, “Chile, Mar Presencial and the Law of the Sea,” 73. 
85 Ibid., 156. 
86 Armada de Chile, http://www.armada.cl/p4_armada/site/edic/2004_08_09_1/port/portada1.html. 




sea. By enhancing interoperability, RIMPAC helps to promote stability in the Pacific Rim 
region.”88 RIMPAC objectives include war fighting skills as well as security cooperation 
items like Maritime Interception Operations (MIO), Regional Maritime Security Initiative 
(RMSI) and Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). In 2008, RIMPAC was composed of 
ten participating countries which “support the Maritime Strategy by building trust. Trust 
enables partnerships and strong partnerships increase maritime security.”89 RMSI is 
intended to “develop a partnership of willing regional partners with varying capabilities 
and capacities to identify, monitor, and intercept transnational maritime threats under 
existing international and domestic laws” while PSI is “a global effort to stem the 
proliferation, by any means, of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery 
systems.”90 
PANAMAX is a “U.S. Southern Command-sponsored exercise focused on 
ensuring the defense of the Panama Canal, one of the most strategically and economically 
crucial waterways in the world. FA PANAMAX 2008 exercised ground, sea and air 
responses to any request from the government of Panama to assist in protecting and 
guaranteeing safe passage through the canal and ensuring its neutrality.”91 Naval 
objectives for this exercise include maritime interdiction and increasing interoperability. 
Twenty nations participated in PANAMAX 2008 due to the “importance that the 
international community places on freedom of navigation as a pillar of security and 
stability worldwide.”92 
All these exercises have a common theme of increasing interoperability, the 
ability to work as a multi-nation naval coalition and practicing maritime interdiction 
operation. These are going to be the key skill sets when working with partner navies to 
maintain the security and stability of the oceans of the world. The fact that Chile chooses 
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to participate in these U.S. sponsored exercises demonstrates a level of interest in being 
an active participant in the naval security cooperation initiatives that are being carried out 
in the Eastern Pacific. 
A PASSEX is simply a passing exercise done between two navies to practice 
communication and coordination drills to be proficient during times of war. The fact that 
the Chilean navy performs these exercises with the U.S. is an indicator that the navies of 
these two countries work together and would like to remain proficient at doing so. 
Looking at the present to determine the future, the statements of the Chilean 
Commanders since 2003 are revealing. In 2003, Chilean ADM Miguel Vergara expressed 
an interest in obtaining unmanned vehicles with the “aim of having real-time information 
from the air for different zones of interest.”93 In 2004, he also stated that the Chilean 
Navy wanted to fulfill two missions: presence and control, and that to fulfill this purpose 
his units needed to be interoperable with other navies.94 The following year he again 
stressed interoperability and a “common doctrine and a workable command-and-control 
system in place so as to share and understand the tactical picture, have timely knowledge 
of relevant intelligence, and comprehend what is expected of each participant nation.”95 
These statements indicate that the Chilean Admirals view interoperability in the Chile-
U.S. or Chile-NATO sense and not particularly in regards to Peru. In 2006, Chilean ADM 
Rodolfo Codina Diaz mentioned “capabilities to interoperate with other navies, not only 
those with high technological development, but also those of the same region.”96 In 2007, 
ADM Codina was asked “From your point of navy’s point of view, what elements do you 
think should be included in the new U.S. maritime strategy, and what elements do you 
suggest that the United States avoid?” ADM Codina response was “rapid response 
structures that include a combination of maritime domain awareness network, rapid inter- 
and intra-theater maritime transportation, forces that are forward deployed, and other 
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forces at home, in their respective countries. For this last case, those forces closest to the 
threat focus will be first to respond. Here is where the 1,000-Ship Navy concept comes 
into play, sharing the load of providing maritime security in common interest of the 
international community, both regionally and globally.”97 Finally, in 2008, ADM 
Codina’s statement was that “international security is now everyone’s responsibility. 
With the downsizing of forces common across the globe, emphasis is on the need for 
cooperation to maintain international peace and security – the mandatory condition in the 
pursuit of development.”98 What these statements from 2003 to the present reveal is a 
shared desire for interoperability and a willingness of the Chilean Navy to take part in the 
international stage and the MDA environment in partnership with the U.S. One of the key 
points is that Chile is looking North, past Peru, to the U.S. and East to Europe for support 
and partnership. 
The Chilean Navy’s area of responsibility is 799,600 square miles (3,998 of 
coastline and 200 miles of Economic Exclusion Zone). However, the figure jumps up to 
19,486, 252 square miles when taken all the way to the international date line (3,998 of 
coastline and 4,874 miles – the distance between Valparaiso and the International Date 
Line). The Chilean Navy has the “Mar Presencial” concept, which operates on the 
assumption that a country’s interests are frequently beyond the limits of its economic 
exclusion zone and should consequently be monitored and protected.”99 This doctrine 
partly explains their desire to push for the International Date Line along with economic 
expansion. The resources for the Chilean navy to meet MDA requirements up to the EEZ 
include: eight helicopter capable aircraft, four submarines, nine fast attack craft, six large 
patrol craft and ten coastal patrol craft.100 Also, the Chilean Navy is limited to one oiler 
that, “diminishes the navy’s capacity to patrol Chile’s long coast and deep into the 
Pacific. Acquiring a second oiler is therefore high among the service’s current 
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priorities.”101 The Coast Guard contributes with “three converted fishing vessels, two 
coastal patrol craft, 10 high-speed cutters, 15 inshore patrol craft, two pilot cutters, 
numerous surface skimmers and Zodiac craft for inshore patrol and rescue, (and) sixteen 
fast patrol craft.”102 Besides considering if these ships are enough to provide MDA 
coverage for all of Chile’s responsibility in the Eastern Pacific, it is going to be 
interesting to see how the increasing cost of fuel will affect future operations.  
Chile has a national objective to extend its reach to the International Date Line. 
This will require a greater maritime reach and capability. There are economic reasons that 
drive Chile and its navy into a greater role that goes beyond the Mar Presencial concept. 
Among these reasons is Chile as the sixth largest exporter of fish products in the word, 
with China being number one and Peru number two. The fishing sector is the third 
exporting sector of the country after mining and industry. Fisheries usually account for 
12-13 percent of external sales for Chile and so is a significant part of the Chilean 
economy.103 The discovery of underwater gas hydrates along the coast of Southern Chile 
also calls for expanded maritime presence, as “one cubic meter of methane hydrate…is 
equivalent to more than 100 kilograms of liquid gas.”104 Finally, the Armada de Chile 
will reopen the Arturo Prat naval base on Greenwich Island, which was closed down in 
2002, to counter British plans to increase their Antarctic holdings and the natural 
resources that this area might provide.105 For all the reasons mentioned above the Area of 
Responsibility for the Armada de Chile has grown to over 26 million square kilometers as 
indicated by the image below. 
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To carry out the vigilance, protection and defense of the patrimony and 
National Interest in the maritime realm; assume Internal Control in states 
of emergency, when decreed by the President of the Republic, participate 
in the economic and social development of the country and in the Civil 
Defense according to the law, with the end to contribute in guaranteeing 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic 
against any threat external or internal and to achieve the national 
objectives.  
Mission of the Peruvian Navy 
A. HISTORY 
The Chilean expedition to liberate Peru carried with it the seeds of the Peruvian 
Navy in 1821 when José de San Martín arrived with Lord Cochrane in Peru, but chose to 
stay there to fight and expel the Spanish. San Martín believed in “the necessity to 
dominate the sea to reach Lima and guarantee Independence as well as the urgent 
formation of a wartime navy.”107 Unlike Chile, whose naval tradition is based on the 
British model, the Peruvian navy retained its Spanish heritage. When the Peruvian Navy 
was first created, on October 8, 1821, it retained the Spanish Naval Ordnances of 
1802.108 However, they did have a British officer, Marín Jorge Guise, who achieved the 
rank of Vice Admiral and Chief of the Squadron. He handled some reorganization issues 
like the running of the Naval School, but the running of the navy was basically in 
accordance with the inherited Spanish naval tradition.109 
During the 1820’s there was a period of anarchy in Peru, which was resolved 
when Simón Bolívar was installed as dictator of Peru. Later, Grand Marshall Andres de 
Santa Cruz was named interim president of the republic and Peru sought a total break 
away from Bolívar who was in Gran Colombia at the time. To further increase tensions 
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“the Peruvian army had contributed in Bolivia to an abdication of General Sucre, abolish 
the Bolivian constitution and (attempt) the election of General Santa Cruz as president of 
Bolivia.”110 In response to this, Bolivar ordered his troops to “fly to the border of Peru to 
avenge this outrage.”111 This led to the War with Gran Colombia in 1828. When the tally 
was made “the labor carried out by the Peruvian navy was efficacious and very certain; 
however the overall conclusion is not so positive when we see how the land campaign did 
not go as planned.”112 
The 1830’s saw the creation of a Peru-Bolivian Confederation, which worried 
Chile. On August 21, 1836, the “Surprise of Callao” happened when two Chilean vessels 
approached Callao in a peaceful manner, but at night captured three Peruvian vessels 
which were to be kept under Chilean control until the Peruvians could give “sufficient 
guarantees of peace.”113 The Peruvian response was to legalize the Chilean possession of 
the three vessels and to promise not to arm any ship for four months.114 The 1830s would 
see a total of four Chilean incursions and naval gun battles into Peruvian waters. 
In the mid 1840’s, a commission was sent to the U.S. which ended up purchasing 
the first steam powered warship for the Peruvian navy, the Rímac.115 In 1848, 
California’s gold rush attracted Peruvians and Peruvian merchant marine ships to 
California coast. Merchant ship’s crews would desert to try their luck at finding gold and 
leave the Peruvian ships unmanned on U.S. coasts. Because of this need to protect and 
recuperate the ships of the Peruvian maritime trade, the Peruvian warship Gamarra was 
sent on a voyage to San Francisco to provide crews to all the abandoned boats in January 
of 1849. Upon her successful return in July of that year, the Peruvian navy felt they  
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contributed to “the international presence of Peru” and talks were held to see if they 
needed to permanently station a Peruvian warship in San Francisco harbor to protect 
Peruvian interests.116 
In 1866, the War with Spain ensued when they took over the Chincha Islands for 
their guano. Peru declared war on Spain on January 14, 1866 and when the Spanish 
bombarded Valparaiso, this brought Chile into the war and the result was the retreat of 
the Spanish vessels from the South American coast. As such, it was hailed as a victory for 
Peru over Spanish reassertions in the South American continent.117 
Peru’s role in the War of the Pacific (1879-1884) included the great naval gun 
battles of the Huascar. This included five successful campaigns against the Chilean navy, 
usually outnumbered. Of the Huascar, President Theodore Roosevelt said, “the most 
famous and remembered ship, upon which the greatest acts of heroism the world has ever 
seen have been committed in an ironclad of any nation in the world.”118 This led to the 
Chilean preoccupation with the Huascar driving it into a focal point of the battle, and 
eventually leading to its capture. The Chileans still hold the Huascar as a memorial ship 
and is a point of contention with Peru, who wants its return. 
During the remainder of the 19th century, the Peruvian Navy was involved in 
scientific pursuits to include hydrography, astronomy and the founding members of the 
Lima Geographical Society were naval officers.119 
Peruvian Naval Aviation was born in the 1920s. At the same time, an American 
Naval Mission was sent to Peru. This  is said to have led to “great progress in the national 
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selection, a great part of the regulations were reformed, greater efficiency was brought 
into the functioning of the Navy, and great enthusiasm and work in the service of the 
Armada.”120 
B. PERUVIAN POLITICS 
The importance of parties lies in that they provide “critical information about 
what candidates stand for and how they can be expected to govern.”121 Parties also “hold 
elected leaders accountable” and when they are strong, which is not the case in Peru, are 
able to provide checks and balances.122 In Peru, a weak four-party system composed of 
United Left (IU), the American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA), Popular Action 
(AP) and the Popular Christian Party (PPC) was established with all the structures in 
place for democratic governance.123 However, one event would drastically alter their 
established order. This was the “structural” change, which included “the elimination of 
the last barriers to full suffrage, large scale urban migration, and the expansions of the 
urban informal sector.”124 Here, it is important to note how the inclusion of indigenous 
voters who before suffered from a “crisis of representation” change the way the elites and 
their parties had been managing their parties and how these parties now have to take into 
account this part of the population if they want to get elected. On top of that, there was 
the insurgency started by Shining Path coupled with up to 7,000 percent inflation during 
the presidency of Alan Garcia, which eroded the public’s confidence in the power of 
parties to effectively govern the Peruvian state and increase the quality of life of their 
citizens.125 
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With the political parties in Peru suffering from a lack of popular support and 
legitimacy, there was a “crisis” moment. This event has been called the “rise of the 
outsider” and explains how a political outsider can take hold of power and undermine the 
democratic institutions to avoid checks to their increasing power. 
In Peru, the run-off election laws served to put an unknown candidate into power. 
No one expected Fujimori to scrape into second place in the elections where the famous 
author Mario Vargas Llosa, running under the PPC, was advocating neo-liberal reform 
for Peru. Garcia backed Fujimori’s candidacy, which opposed neo-liberal reform, and 
sacrificed his party for his gain instead of supporting the APRA candidate. Therefore, the 
two factors that allowed Fujimori to gain the presidency in Peru as an independent 
unknown were the “structural” nature of the weak party system and socio economic 
factors of that point in time and the “fortuitous” nature of how the events played out to 
include Garcia’s backing and large abstentions from the opposition.  
In 1992, Fujimori carried out a self-coup (autogolpe) claiming it was “necessary 
to rid Peru of a false democracy.”126 The success of this autogolpe was based on 
“Fujimori (vanquishing) two forces that Peruvians had come to find unbearable: 
hyperinflation and the cycle of protest and violence that had culminated in the terrorism 
of Shining Path.”127 
Fujimori’s success with the autogolpe consolidated popular support in Peru as the 
“strong leader for whom they had been yearning” and this in effect, “buried the 
established parties,” creating a new paradigm in Peruvian politics, Fujimori versus the 
opposition.128 Because parties were discredited in Peru and Fujimori’s rise to power was 
achieved without an established party, this led to two conclusions for Peruvian 
politicians. “First, they concluded that a defense of the political status quo ante was not a 
viable electoral strategy. Not only did public support for Fujimori make the defense of 
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democratic institutions unprofitable, but such a strategy associated politicians with the 
discredited old guard elite that led the opposition.”129 The second conclusion for 
politicians was “that they no longer needed parties.”130 This led to a rise of independent 
candidates as “new and aspiring politicians began to create their own parties instead of 
joining existing ones” as was the case with Alejandro Toledo’s Peru Posible which “had 
no raison d’être other than Toledo’s presidential candidacy.”131 
Another obstacle to democracy was the use of social spending as a political tool. 
When Fujimori needed to garner votes or political support, he simply turned on the spigot 
of funds and this in turn served to crowd out the opposition who had nothing to compete 
with other than words. “The second Fujimori administration saw the highest social 
expenditure levels in two decades, and this helps explain the regime’s greater support 
among the poorest of the poor. This support was based through effective clientelistic 
schemes which targeted social expenditure under a centralized structure, controlled by the 
presidency.”132 
While these examples of Peruvian politics have put foreign policy into the 
interests of the political leaders and their allies, Peru is characterized as a harboring 
deliberate statist-nationalist strategy. Mani states that this is because “leaders favor 
exclusionary methods and enjoy cohesive political support, translating belligerent 
opportunism into systematically- implemented policy decisions that promote international 
conflict.”133 This argument is based on the Peru-Ecuador conflict and sheds interesting 
insight when trying to understand Peruvian strategic thinking. However, there is an  
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example when this strategic mindset affecting the Peru-Chile relationship when Peru 
initiated an arms race in 1974, “leading to war scares, military mobilizations, and 
continued tension for several years.”134 
During the Fujimori years, the threat of Shining Path was neutralized in 1992 and 
the military was no longer needed for an internal security role and was used by the 
regime to do saber-rattling under statist-nationalist lines which eventually lead to the 
1995 war with Ecuador.135 Peru lost this war and due to the equipment losses, it led to the 
“purchase of a record number of new aircraft – 18 MiG29 attack aircraft and 18 SU-25 
close support aircraft.”136 Even though these purchases would constitute the “most 
sophisticated fighters of any Latin American country” the lack of maintenance and 
upgrading clauses into the deal would render this a deterrent threat based on perception 
more than actual capability.137 Regardless, these purchases are seen to affect the balance 
of power and serve to boost acquisition programs in surrounding countries for advanced 
aircraft. 
C. TODAY’S MARINA DE GUERRA DEL PERU 
Today, the Peruvian Navy has a history of working with the United States. 
According to the Peruvian Navy website (Marina de Guerra del Peru) the Peruvian Navy 
has participated in the following joint exercises with the U.S.: UNITAS, RIMPAC, 
SIFOREX, joint submarine training with the U.S., and PASSEX.138  
Silent Force Exercise (SIFOREX) an Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) exercise 
where the U.S. Navy trains against real diesel submarines as opposed to synthetic threats 
or nuclear submarines. “Diesel electric submarines’ ability to run virtually silent presents 
a detection challenge to ships and aircraft. These subs are only used by foreign navies, so 
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the United States depends on countries such as Peru to conduct these training 
exercises.”139 These exercises strengthen relationships and interoperability between the 
U.S. Navy and the Peruvian Navy. 
Statements by Peruvian Admirals in Proceedings reveal a willingness to work 
with the U.S., but with a prime importance given to sovereignty. In 2005, Peruvian ADM 
Jose Luis Noriega Lores stated, “interoperability with other navies and the exchange of 
doctrine and procedures are crucial nowadays” and mentioned Peruvian participation in 
U.S. naval exercises involving frigates and submarines.140 In 2006, Peruvian ADM Jorge 
Ampuero Trabucco stated the “desire to develop an interoperable capability among our 
navies” and “the principle of no intervention in others state matters.”141 In 2007, 
Peruvian RADM Wladimirio Giovannini y Freire, Secretary General, Peruvian Navy 
stated that “cooperative work on a global scale should be included in the general strategy, 
as should development of a legal framework in accordance with international law…the 
importance of not intervening in other countries’ internal affairs…Respect for 
sovereignty is high.”142 Thus while both Chile and Peru seek greater levels of 
interoperability, Chile seems to be more interested in participating in the world stage and 
Peru seems to be more interested in respecting sovereignty. 
The Peruvian Navy’s area of responsibility is 300,000 square miles (1,500 miles 
of coastline x 200 miles of EEZ) To cover this area the navy has the following: eight 
frigates, one cruiser, seven fast attack craft, four patrol craft, and six submarines.143 This 
excludes riverine craft and auxiliaries. They also have five tankers. The Coast Guard 
assets include 61 varied types of patrol craft.144 As is the case with Chile, besides 
considering if these ships are enough to provide MDA coverage for Peru’s responsibility  
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in the Eastern Pacific, it is going to be interesting to see how the increasing cost of fuel 
will affect future operations. However, Peru does not have a “Mar Presencial” or 
equivalent concept like Chile. 
One of the goals of this thesis is to understand the reason for Peru’s concern with 
sovereignty, the operational implications of this concern, and how these concerns might 
be addressed. It is possible that past conflicts with both the United States and Chile are 
the sources of these concerns. Perhaps one of the explanations for the Peruvian stance is 
the previous conflict with the U.S. in the Economic Exclusion Zone over the protection of 
marine resources. History reminds us of the U.S.-Peruvian “Tuna War” of 1969 when 
U.S. vessels were fishing 40 miles off the coast of Peru. This led to two Peruvian patrol 
boats being deployed. One U.S. ship was detained and fined $10,500 and a second U.S. 
ship was strafed with “40-60 machine gun bullets into her upper parts.”145 In the case of 
Chile/Peru cooperation, another hurdle to be overcome is the loss of land to Chile in the 
War of the Pacific (1879-1883) as well as current maritime boundary dispute, with Peru 
filing a lawsuit against Chile in the International Court of Justice at The Hague.146  
The Peruvian naval goals and objectives are more inward looking, because 
besides control of the seas, the role of the Peruvian navy is “assume internal control in 
states of emergency, when deemed appropriate by the President of the Republic, 
participate in the social and economic development of the country and with Civil Defense 
according to law, with the end to guarantee the independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity of the Republic against any threat, external or internal.”147 Peru has the world’s 
second largest commercial fisheries, and is a “key component of the country’s economy. 
It is the second highest generator of foreign currency after mining, accounting for U.S.$ 
1,124 million dollars in export in 2001.”148 Therefore, protection of their ‘territorial seas’ 
                                                 
145 Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments, Peru, 64-65. 
146 Xinhua, Peru, Chile Locked in Maritime Territory Dispute, January 19, 2008, 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-01/19/content_7451066.htm. 
147 Mision de la Marina de Guerra del Peru, http://www.marina.mil.pe/marina_actual/mision.htm. 





and preventing other countries from reaping unauthorized benefits from the use of their 
fisheries remains a vital national security issue.149 Another reason for Peru be highly 
interested in securing their territorial seas is Petro-Tech Peruana Oil Company confirmed 
reserves of 1.132 billion barrels of high quality oil off the coasts of the provinces of Piura 
and Lambayaque.150  
In the case of Peru, they have a history of working with the U.S. that is likely to 
keep deepening the relationship between these two navies. They have had a historic 
rivalry with Chile that still affects state and military decision making. Perhaps inroads are 
being made to transform the perception of Chile as a hostile country; some evidence of 
this is both Chile and Peru’s ability to resolve their maritime dispute in the ICJ at the 
Hague while maintaining cordial relationships with one another. Peru holds faster to the 
statist-nationalist strategy than Chile this might mean a more hesitant approach to naval 
cooperation with Chile and a focus on sovereignty that trumps intervention except in 
clearly delineated cases. 
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V. UNITED STATES 
Whenever and wherever the opportunity exists, we must develop and 
sustain relationships that will help to improve the capacity of our 
emerging and enduring partners’ maritime forces, and help them achieve 
common desired effects. 
Admiral Mike Mullen 
A. U.S. BACKGROUND 
The American background is well known to readers, notable professional authors 
such as Holden and Zolov paint an interesting picture concerning security cooperation 
between the United States and Latin America. The relationship between the United States 
and Latin America can be traced to aspects of our foreign policy dating back to the 
nineteenth century. Starting with the No Transfer Doctrine signed by Congress in 1811 
which stipulated that no land currently in Spanish hands would “pass from the hands of 
Spain into those of any other foreign power”151 to prevent any British and French designs 
upon Latin America and Florida. This paternal mantle that the United States visited upon 
Latin America would be formalized in the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 where the United 
States warned the European powers that “any attempt on their part to extend their system 
to any portion of this hemisphere (will be considered) as dangerous to our peace and 
safety.”152 The ability to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, however, did not come to pass 
until the twentieth century and even then, it was not until after 1945 that U.S. influence in 
the Western Hemisphere came into its own. For many observers the loss of the USS 
Maine in Havana, which brought about the Spanish-American War (1898-1902), was a 
crucial turning point. The war, which the U.S. won, led to the transfer of Cuba, Puerto 
Rico, Guam, the Philippines and the Caroline Islands from Spain to the United States. 
The Platt Amendment of 1901 created the legal backing for “the right to intervene 
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for…the protection of life, property and individual liberty.”153 In 1904, the Roosevelt 
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine stated that foreign interference in Latin America by 
Western Powers “may force the United States, however reluctantly… to the exercise of 
an international police power.”154 Against this backdrop, the U.S. Navy carried out 
foreign policy in Latin America in the first half of the twentieth century using “gunboat 
diplomacy.” However, this would change as the Cold War emerged. 
During the Cold War, especially the U.S. concern about the Cuban Revolution of 
1959 spreading to other countries in Latin America, the United States engaged in a 
concerted effort to keep communism out of the Western Hemisphere. The National 
Security Doctrine established for Latin America was that the United States would fight 
the external communist threat and the countries in the Western Hemisphere would root 
out communism within their borders. The National Security Council’s “policy for the 
1950’s was to support Latin American dictators, (because) these friendly dictators helped 
the United States by repressing communists.”155 Our relation with Latin American 
leaders who supported our agenda was supportive, “where anticommunist dictators were 
able to maintain stability, U.S. support continued, particularly in the form of military 
assistance.”156 During the Cold War, Latin America would have its share of military 
dictatorships that thwarted communist forces to include: Nicaragua, Chile, Brazil, and 
Argentina. Eventually all these countries transferred back to democracy. As the Cold War 
was waning, a new joint venture appeared on the scene in Latin America, the War on 
Drugs. 
The “War on Drugs” in the 1980s brought a wave of security cooperation and 
assistance aimed at “enhancing the ability of Latin American armed forces to carry out 
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counternarcotics initiatives.”157 This led the United States to fund the creation of units to 
include “a Bolivian air force unit and a naval group to carry out drug interdiction 
operation”158 and “a ‘riverine’ program to help the security forces of Colombia and Peru 
to interdict drugs on rivers.”159 Also militaries in the region received training from U.S. 
forces which some critics claim have precipitated a higher degree of “militarization” in 
the region, with Mexico, Brazil, Colombia and pre-Evo Morales Bolivia relying on the 
armed forces for internal problems.  
Now we are engaged in the “War on Terror” and this has changed the focus of the 
lens through which we view aid and cooperation to a much broader scale. These broad 
definitions blur the lines between police and military roles with U.S. view advocating 
cooperation within all the resources of the state and restructuring them to meet the state’s 
security needs. One of the most known of these programs is “Plan Colombia,” which 
started out as a counter-drug aid program and after 9/11 has been expanded to include 
counter-terror aid. This new way of looking at a state’s security resources is also making 
its way to the maritime side as joint cooperation between the navy and coast guard of 
these countries is now being looked upon to keep the oceans safe against the wide 
number of threats that can fall under the “terrorism” namesake. Bottom line: The 
literature suggests that the following are necessary ingredients, but are sometimes 
overlooked by the U.S., particularly when the technical challenges of cooperation are 
great: shared threat assessment/ priority assigned by both sides; understanding of 
sovereignty issues; resource issue (who’s paying?) Drug control efforts, for example, are 
often a priority for the U.S. but not for the partner country, which is willing to extend 
formal cooperation in return for CD assistance funds. 
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B. U.S. POLICY 
The foundations for Security Cooperation between the U.S. Navy and the navies 
of Chile and Peru can be traced to our national policy. In the National Security Strategy 
(NSS) of The United States of America, it is stated that our national security strategy is 
“founded on two pillars: The first pillar is promoting freedom, justice and human dignity. 
The second pillar is confronting the challenges of our time by leading a growing 
community of democracies… Effective multinational efforts are essential to solve these 
problems.”160 The NSS then outlines nine “essential tasks,” four of which directly tie in 
to security cooperation. These are “1) Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and 
work to prevent attacks against us and our friends; 2) Work with others to diffuse 
regional conflicts; 3) Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets 
and trade; and 4) Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of 
global power.”161 The last item stresses the need to “join with other nations around the 
world…to improve the capacity of all nations to defend their homelands against terrorism 
and transnational criminals.”162 All these policy statements lay the groundwork for the 
behavior and actions of the U.S. Government and its agencies like the U.S. Navy with 
other states. The four strategic priorities of the USG in the Western Hemisphere are 
“bolstering security, strengthening democratic institutions, promoting prosperity, and 
investing in people.”163 From these statements it is clear that the policy of the United 
States mandates working with other governments and securing the avenues of commerce 
and stability, like the sea for Chile and Peru that rely on 80% of their trade through their 
17 and 14 ports, respectively, as “essential tasks” of our NSS. 
The next level of policy is the National Military Strategy (NMS) of the United 
States of America. In this document it is stated that “we must strengthen collaboration 
(with our) multinational partners. Key to such collaboration is an improved ability to 
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collect, process and share information.”164 The concept of integration is one of the 
strategic principles and it is important because of its “enabling multinational partners 
through security cooperation and other engagements (to) enhance the ability of the 
Armed Forces to not only prevent conflict and deter aggression but also supports 
combatant commanders’ plans to quickly undertake operations over great distances and 
in sometimes overlapping conflicts.”165 The NMS has three objectives, these are: “protect 
the United States; prevent conflict and surprise attack; and prevail against 
adversaries.”166 Under protect the United States, a key component is Creating a Global 
Anti-Terrorism Environment. This means “working with other nation’s militaries and 
other governmental agencies, the Armed Forces help to establish favorable security 
conditions and increase the capabilities of its partners. The relationships developed in 
these interactions contribute to the global antiterrorism environment that further reduces 
threats to the United States, its allies and its interests.”167 To Promote Security the NMS 
directs “military forces (to) engage in security cooperation (SC) activities to establish 
important military interactions, building trust and confidence between the United States 
and its multinational partners. These relatively small investments often produce results 
that far exceed their cost.”168 SC is seen as a win-win strategy as besides helping further 
U.S. NMS objectives it also “encourages nations to develop, modernize and transform 
their own capabilities, thereby increasing the capability of partners and helping them to 
help themselves.”169  
The National Strategy for Maritime Security (NSMS) states, “The safety and the 
economic security of the United States depend in substantial part upon the secure use of 
the world’s oceans. The United States has a vital national interest in maritime security. 
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We must be prepared to stop terrorists and rogue states before they can threaten or use 
weapons of mass destruction or engage in other attacks against the United States and our 
allies and friends. Toward that end, the United States must take full advantage of 
strengthened alliances and other international cooperative arrangements.”170 The two 
main threats identified by the NSMS are terrorists and the transnational criminal/piracy 
threat. 
The terrorist threat can use multiple venues in the maritime environment to further 
their goals. “Some terrorist groups have used shipping as a means of conveyance for 
positioning their agents, logistical support and generating revenue.”171 Terrorist can also 
use the maritime environment to perpetrate attacks via “explosives-laden suicide boats, 
merchant and cruise ships as kinetic weapons to ram another vessel, warship, port facility 
or offshore platform.”172 Finally, the NSMS states “terrorists can also take advantage of a 
vessel’s legitimate cargo, such as chemicals, petroleum, or liquefied natural gas, as the 
explosive component of an attack. Vessels can be used to transport powerful 
conventional explosives or WMD for detonation in a port or alongside an offshore 
facility.”173  
Transnational criminal activities and piracy poses a threat to maritime security. 
“Piracy and incidents of maritime crime tend to be concentrated in areas of heavy 
commercial maritime activity.”174 As stated before, Chile and Peru depend heavily on 




                                                 
170 The National Strategy for Maritime Security, 1, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/4844-
nsms.pdf.  
171 Ibid., 4. 
172 Ibid. 
173 Ibid. 




Hence, the NSMS has three principles. “First, preserving the freedom of the seas 
is a top national priority. Second, the United States Government must facilitate and 
defend commerce to ensure this uninterrupted flow of shipping. Third, the United States 
Government must facilitate the movement of desirable goods and people across our 
borders, while screening out dangerous people and material.”175 
These guiding principles direct the maritime forces of the United States to prevent 
terrorist acts from taking place with the specific guidance to “detect, deter, interdict, and 
defeat terrorist attacks, criminal acts, or hostile acts in the maritime domain, and prevent 
its unlawful exploitation for those purposes.”176 Integral to achieving this objective is 
working with international partners. “Assisting regional partners to maintain the maritime 
sovereignty of their territorial seas and international waters is a longstanding objective of 
the United States and contributes directly to the partners’ economic development.”177 
Enhancing international cooperation is part of the NSMS. This will include the 
creation of new initiatives and the enforcement of existing ones such as the Container 
Security Initiative, the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Customs-Trade Partnership 
Against Terrorism and others. These initiatives “will be coordinated by the Department 
of State and will include provisions such as: Developing, funding, and implementing 
effective measures for interdicting suspected terrorists or criminals; Developing and 
expanding means of rapid exchanges among governments of relevant intelligence and 
law enforcement information concerning suspected terrorist or criminal activity in the 
maritime domain; Adopting procedures for enforcement action against vessels entering or 
leaving a nation’s ports, internal waters, or territorial seas when they are reasonably 
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and adopting streamlined procedures for inspecting vessels reasonably suspected of 
carrying suspicious cargo and seizing such cargo when it is identified as a subject of 
confiscation.”178 
In order to accomplish this, the United States will engage in a concerted effort to 
maximize maritime domain awareness by leveraging its “global maritime intelligence 
capabilities. This intelligence enterprise will support United States Government agencies 
and international partners in securing the maritime domain.”179 This will require a robust 
maritime command-and-control structure that will allow all “international coalitions to 
share maritime situational awareness on a timely basis.”180 
One of the ways this global intelligence network of partner navies securing the 
maritime domain will achieve its goal is by “interdiction of personnel and material. The 
United States, along with its international partners, will monitor those vessels, cargoes, 
and people of interest from the point of origin, through intervening ports, to the point of 
entry to ensure the integrity of the transit, to manage maritime traffic routing, and, if 
necessary, to interdict or divert vessels for inspection and search.”181 
The NSMS clearly states that the U.S. maritime assets will work with partner 
nations, share intelligence, and, when deemed necessary, interdict suspect vessels. 
C. EXAMPLES OF NAVAL COOPERATION 
Some examples of naval cooperation include the United States and India in the 
Indian Ocean as well as the Royal Australian Navy in the Pacific Ocean. On September 
2007, a conference was held in New Delhi to discuss the future of a U.S.-India Strategic 
Partnership. The following are key points that also have bearing on the U.S., Chile and 
Peru naval cooperation. First, there is the consensus on U.S. supremacy that “the United 
States will continue to be the major power in the Indian Ocean and beyond for the 
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foreseeable future, but other countries and non-state actors have the potential to create 
serious security problems.”182 The same can be said for the Eastern Pacific in relation to 
U.S. Supremacy and the understanding of this by Chile and Peru as well as the potential 
threat of non-state actors to the region. Second, is the navy as a foreign policy tool, in this 
case it was “the Indian Navy is a powerful tool for Indian foreign policy and diplomacy, a 
fact that is beginning to be recognized by civilian policy makers in India.”183 The 
governments of Chile and Peru, by engaging their navies in these security cooperation 
agreements are indeed recognizing the foreign policy potential of their navies. The third 
item of relevance is technology, “India remains very keen on gaining access to U.S. 
defense technology to facilitate its plans to play a larger role in the Indian Ocean 
region.”184 Both Chile and Peru are currently engaged in modernization programs and 
they stand to benefit from technology transfer programs that participation in a joint 
maritime environment would bring about, specially in the areas of interoperability, 
command-and-control and networks. 
The challenges to interdiction cooperation between the United States and India 
include “legal concerns; operational concerns (such as command of operations and intra- 
and inter-state coordination); practical problems (bureaucracies, the difficulty of 
intelligence sharing, and the dichotomy between secrecy and transparency); the political 
limits of support for the program; and the attitudinal issues, primarily the resistance to the 
program being led by the United States and the challenges of commercial opportunities 
versus security.”185 These serve as an indicator as what the likely hurdles to interdiction 
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concerns with the Container Security Initiative (CSI) include the political issues, the fact 
that India is uncomfortable with U.S. inspectors in Indian ports, the mandated use of only 
American equipment, and concerns over time delays and commercial losses.”186 
Another challenge lies with WMD interdiction in the maritime domain and “the 
difference between interdicting actual nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological 
weapons and interdicting dual-use components of WMD and delivery systems.”187 The 
article then points out that interdiction is more effective against states than terrorists or 
non-state actors, however, laying the basis for interdiction across the world by partner 
navies from India in the Indian Ocean to Chile and Peru in the Eastern Pacific is the new 
challenge and reality that the navies of this era are going to have to deal with. 
So far, we have seen the challenges facing joint naval security cooperation, but 
what are the enablers of cooperation. Five key factors are suggested, these are: “relaxing 
sovereignty sensitivities, extra regional power interests, increased prevalence of 
cooperation of norms, improving state resources, and increasing prioritization of 
maritime security.”188  
States sometimes tend to equate sovereignty with security and a “reduction of 
sovereignty seems tantamount to decreased security”189 or that foreign powers will 
operate in national waters to undermine security. “Nonetheless, in recent years states 
have been increasingly willing to allow infringement upon or qualification of their 
sovereignty for the sake of improved maritime security.”190 For example, Malaysia and 
Indonesia brought differences regarding the ownership of the Litigan and Sipadan Islands 
to the ICJ and both parties accepted the ruling in favor of Malaysia.191 This is remarkably 
similar to Chile and Peru resolving their maritime border dispute at the ICJ as well. 
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Extra regional power interests include initiatives such as the CSI and PSI that 
“draw attention to transnational maritime threats and the desirability of greater 
cooperation.”192 While these initiatives receive strong support from the U.S., its success 
is increased by the participation of partner navies and by doing so it draws them into a 
cooperative arrangement to the benefit of all. Some examples include, the Indian and 
U.S. navies working together to “ensure the safe transit of high-value units through the 
Straits of Malacca” in 2002.193 The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) has “increasingly 
assumed constabulary roles appropriate to trans-national threats, and in 2004 it carried 
out command-level sea-lane security exercises with several regional states.”194 In fact, 
the RAN has international engagement at the strategic, operational and tactical level. At 
the strategic level, the RAN has established “dialogue and reciprocal visit with 
counterparts; Navy HQ level Navy to Navy talks; and an International Fora.”195 
Operationally, “Fleet Commander visits regional counterparts and the RAN participates 
in combined multi-lateral and bi-lateral operations and exercises.”196 The tactical level 
includes ship visits, PASSEXs, individual training and training exchanges.197 
The forms of cooperation that we can learn and profit from are bilateral 
cooperation and networked cooperation. “Bilateral cooperation, though it involves only 
two states, can be more productive than multilateral initiatives in producing operational 
maritime cooperation.”198 This make sense as it takes more effort to get three or more 
nations to get to agree on a set of mutual goals and objectives than it is to get two nations 
that have similar security interests. Thus instead of pushing for some global standard, the  
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best way to achieve this is by working with the other nations on a state by state basis and 
for the case of this research creating a bilateral U.S.-Chile agreement and a bilateral U.S.-
Peru agreement.  
This takes us to the next level, which would be the “synergetic network of 
bilateral arrangements. Because they are based on bilateral agreements, networked 
cooperation agreements enable states to customize the most direct relationships to 
maximize the value and minimize risk. The networks, however, also increase trust and 
understanding between all their members, thus reducing the cost of building further 
cooperative relationships.”199 
D. ENDURING FRIENDSHIP 
SOUTHCOM already has some programs that are pre-existing and have been 
ongoing prior to the arrival of the thousand ship navy concept. One of these is Enduring 
Friendship, which aims to enhance or build up the maritime capabilities of certain key 
partner nations so they can better police their territorial waters and in so doing, lessen the 
burden on U.S. Navy assets and thus make them available for other missions. This 
program will provide the ability to monitor the coastline with radars, improved 
communications to share information, access to high-speed patrol boats and the 
implementation of command-and-control forces for effective maritime security in the 
Caribbean.200 
The first phase of Enduring Friendship involved the Bahamas, Jamaica, Panama 
and the Dominican Republic. These countries will receive four forty three foot 
interceptor boats with radios, RADAR, Forward Looking Infrared, GPS and the 
Combined Enterprise Regional Information Exchange System (CENTRIXS). They will 
also receive training for operators in Ft. Myers, Florida and maintenance sustainment. 
With this equipment, training and maintenance it is expected that they will have 
improved potential for transit zone detection and interdiction as well as combating illicit 
                                                 
199 Bradford, “The Growing Prospects for Maritime Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia,” 82.  




trafficking. Phase two will include Nicaragua, Honduras, Guatemala and Belize. Phase 
three will incorporate the remainder of the Eastern Caribbean and Regional Security 
System countries.201 
In the past initiatives have failed because of technological hurdles and the lack of 
capability in coordinating elements with adequate command-and-control. Enduring 
friendship comes with CENTRIXS, which is a system designed to easily share 
information in an inexpensive yet interconnected and interoperable manner. With 
Enduring Friendship 32, boats distributed over eight countries will have the capability to 
speak to one another and build a maritime information network that will allow for the 
shared use of video, data and voice.202 
E. GLOBAL FLEET STATION 
The Global Fleet Station is a vision of the future in which the different maritime 
components like military, coast guard and civilian fuse in an integrated environment to 
cross train and promote common interests. In SOUTHCOM, this program was carried out 
under as the Caribbean Support Tender. The USCGC GENTIAN mission was to foster 
cooperation and improve the operational capability of navies in service across the 
Caribbean by engaging in training, maintenance and logistics with partner and 
multinational players. The crew consisted of 29 members of the U.S. Coast Guard and 16 
representatives from the Caribbean countries performing duties side by side who made 
155 country visits delivering over 3.9 million dollars in supplies while assisting in the 
training and development of over 5,500 Caribbean maritime personnel. The successor to 
the GENTIAN under the Global Fleet Station pilot program is the HSV-2 SWIFT wave 
piercing catamaran with an aluminum hull ideal for coastal waters. SWIFT will be 
making port calls and training personnel from Panama, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Belize. Multi-national and multi-agency teams will 
train in the following areas: patrol craft operations, maintenance, medical readiness, port 
                                                 
201 Long, 1,000-Ship Navy: New Concept or Current SOUTHCOM Maritime SOP, 8-9. 




security and professional development. Global Fleet Station continues the legacy of the 
GENTIAN and while some have criticized this approach, it still remains a viable tool for 





Naval security cooperation is not a new phenomenon on the world stage. We have 
already seen several examples, such as the Container Security Initiative, the Proliferation 
Security Initiative, multi-national efforts ensuring the safety of the Straits of Malacca, the 
Royal Australian Navy’s role as a constabulary force in its region, multiple bilateral and 
multilateral treaties, and Enduring Friendship and the Global Fleet Station. However, we 
are exploring a new concept that has been put forth in recent years called the thousand 
ship navy which calls for a global maritime navy of voluntary nations who share common 
goals and are willing to work together to promote stability and security. One possible 
vehicle to implement this thousand ship navy concept is Maritime Domain Awareness.  
In the Eastern Pacific, two maritime states that can engage in this endeavor are 
Chile and Peru. Both of these states have a strong naval tradition and depend heavily on 
their ports for their economic well being and development. The strategic policy makers of 
both of these navies have expressed a willingness to participate in this naval security 
endeavor with the United States. 
This thesis has six conclusions. The first one is that Chile and Peru have common 
goals of security, stability, trade that are in line with the overall scope of the U.S. Navy’s 
push for security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific. Second, the navies Chile and Peru 
are likely to continue interacting with the U.S. Navy at current or more integrated levels 
to include the established exercises and new initiatives. Third, the U.S. is primary force 
behind this initiative. If nothing else, this is indicative of an increase in U.S. cooperation 
with the navies of Chile and Peru. Fourth, based on statements by Chilean and Peruvian 
naval officers mentioned earlier in the text, both of these navies currently do interact 
when it comes to matters of preserving life at sea which is the case in Search and Rescue 
(SAR) operations. Fifth, the likelihood of armed conflict between Chile and Peru has 
become remote. The sixth and final conclusion is that we can expect increased naval 
security cooperation between the U.S., Peru and Chile to be cautious, on the part of the 




Naval security cooperation between Chile and the U.S. Navy can be expected to 
remain at current levels and increase in future years. Chile can be categorized as a 
country in expansion and hence more eager to engage in internationalist efforts. This 
shows in an increased willingness to participate in the world stage. With the boom in 
copper paving the way for modernization of naval assets, the Chilean navy is poised to 
adopt a greater role. Of course, these expenditures will continue be challenged by 
political forces in Chile concerned with social inequality and would like to see a different 
use of those funds. 
The case of Peru while also positive in continuing a successful working 
relationship with the U.S. Navy offers a more guarded approach.  Peru is emerging from 
a slightly more rocky political landscape. From the dictatorship of Velasco it faced 
Shining Path on the eve of its democratization. The violence generated by this conflict 
caused the military to look inwards. With Fujimori in power, democracy was 
compromised while devastating blows were landed to Shining Path and MRTA. Fujimori 
is out of power, but the example of an outsider coming to the presidency without the use 
of parties is still a part of the Peruvian political landscape. For these reasons, Peru is more 
likely to look inward and participate in a more guarded manner in global maritime 
efforts, yet participate nonetheless. 
Identified areas for further research include the understanding of how the navies 
of Chile and Peru would assist in naval security cooperation in the Eastern Pacific. Are 
they content to prolong the status quo, participate in joint exercises, and be active in the 
Container Security Initiative? Or are they willing and ready to aggressively push for a 
thousand ship navy construct in the Eastern Pacific using MDA as a vehicle? If they 
choose MDA as a vehicle how would it work? How would the sensors and intelligence 
these navies and their multi-agencies provide be incorporated into a global MDA picture? 
Would their inputs be sent to Third Fleet or Fourth Fleet? Does the future hold the 
probability of a JHOC-like structure in the Eastern Pacific in either Chile or Peru? Or 
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